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The IDlpact of NSMIA on SDlall Issuers 
By Ruthiford B Campbell) Jr. * 
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND PUGHT OF SMALL 
BUSINESSES 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPORTANCE OF SMAll 
BUSINESSES 
Most of us probably consider small businesses to be economically sig-
nificant to our national economy. One might speculate, in that regard, that 
small businesses generate an important portion of the total productivity 
and jobs available in this country. Looking around in our daily lives, we 
deal with many providers of goods and services that appear to be small 
businesses. These include doctors, lawyers, restaurants, automobile deal-
ers, automobile repairs, laundries, and bookstores (the list goes on and on). 
Not only are these ventures important to consumers, but they also appear 
to be relatively labor-intensive enterprises that provide employment for a 
significant percentage of our work force. l 
Available information indicates that such appearances and impressions 
regarding the important role of small businesses in our economy are es-
sentially accurate. Small businesses are a vital, statistically significant part 
of the economy of the United States, even, perhaps, to an unexpected 
degree. Start, for example, with the very smallest businesses in our econ-
omy, those with fewer than 20 employees. One finds that about 90% of 
all business firms in the United States (approximately 4.5 million firms) 
*Willburt D. Ham Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Kentucky. The author 
thanks George Hunt Rounsavall,Jr., class of 1998, University of Kentucky College of Law, 
for his assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
I. Industries dominated by small business include: eating and drinking places; offices and 
clinics of doctors of medicine; retail stores; automotive repair shops; motor vehicle dealers; 
residential care; services to dwellings and other buildings; management and public relations 
services; home furniture and furnishing stores; and lumber and other building materials 
dealers. Industries dominated by large businesses include: institutions of higher learning; 
security brokers and dealers; motor vehicles and equipment; hospitals; family clothing stores; 
commercial banks; title insurance; air transportation; household appliances; and refrigeration 
and service industry machinery. See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE STATE 
OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1994, at 54, Table 1.13 (1995) [here-
inafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994]. 
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come within this category.2 Such firms employ about 20% of all workers 
(approximately 19 million persons).3 Moving up in size, but certainly still 
within what most would consider to be the category of small businesses, 
firms with less than 100 employees represent 98% of all business firms in 
this country (a total of approximately 5 million firms). These firms provide 
jobs for about 39% of our total work force (approximately 36 million 
jobs).4 
These obviously are huge numbers, and they give some general idea of 
the significance of small businesses, with regard both to the delivery of 
goods and services and to the generation of jobs. One also may sense that 
small entrepreneurs have relatively high levels of energy, vitality, and in-
novativeness and thus that raw, broad economic data of the kind described 
above may even understate the significance of small business. Again, one 
is able to find support for these premises by examining statistics regarding 
job creation and innovations. For example, in 1993, the top 15 industries 
dominated by small businesses created approximately 730,000 jobs, while 
in that same year, the top 15 industries dominated by large firms created 
only approximately 196,000 new jobs.5 Regarding innovation, studies 
commissioned by the SBA estimate that small businesses are respon-
sible for 55% of all manufacturing product innovations and that small 
2. According to data compiled by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), Office 
of Advocacy, there were a total of 5,051,025 business firms in the United States in 1991, of 
which 4,528,899 (89.7% of all firms) had less than 20 employees. See State of Small Business 
1994, supra note I, at Table A.4, p. 164. 
3. The total employment in the United States that year was 92,307,559, and firms with 
less than 20 employees employed 18,712,812 workers, or 20.3% of the total work force. Id. 
This percentage appears to have been fairly constant in recent years. For example, in each 
year during the period from 1988 to 1991, firms with less than 20 employees accounted for 
between 20% and 21 % of all jobs in the United States. Id. at 244, Table A.II. The total 
payroll for 1991 for all firms with less than 20 employees was approximately $381.5 billion, 
which was 17.8% of the total national payroll for that year. Id. at 164, Table A.4. 
4. According to data compiled by the SBA Office of Advocacy for the year 1991, the 
total number of business firms in the country was 5,051,025 and 4,968,710 of the firms had 
less than 100 employees. That year, the total number of workers employed by all firms was 
92,307,559, of which 35,859,223 were employed by firms with less than 100 workers. The 
percentage of the total work force employed by firms with less than 100 employees, which 
for 1991 was 38.8 %, has been reasonably constant in recent years. For example, for the years 
1988 to 1991, the percentage of the total work force employed by firms with less than 100 
employees consistently fell between approximately 39% and 40%. For example, for the year 
1991, the total annual payroll for firms with less than 100 employees was 34.2% of the total 
annual payroll of all firms. Id. at 164, Table A.4, & 244, Table A.II. 
5. /d. at 54, Table 1.13. For 1993, it was reported that" [s]mall-business-dominated in-
dustries added [more than] over a million jobs during the year while large-business-domi-
nated industries reduced employment by over 200,000." Id. at 27. For similar information 
for the period 1982-1993, see id. at 300, Table A.26. For purposes of these tables and statistics, 
"[s]mall-business-dominated industries are industries in which a minimum of 60[%] of the 
industry employment is in firms with fewer than 500 employees." Id. 
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firms account for twice as many innovations per employee as do larger 
firms.6 
Although the foregoing statistical information indicates the importance 
of small businesses to our national economy, the actual value of small 
businesses may transcend such statistics and cold economic evaluations. 
Small businesses have a nearly mystical place in our society. They are a 
part of our national persona. Entrepreneurial opportunities through the 
operation of a small business may be the modern equivalent of the western 
frontier in the nineteenth century, representing an escape valve for those 
ambitious risk-takers who want to make a better life for themselves and 
their families. The venting of the entrepreneurial instinct through small 
business opportunities, therefore, may well be an important component of 
a stable democracy. 
CAPITAL FORMATION THE PllGHT OF SMAlL 
BUSINESSES 
Small businesses need access to external capital, since small businesses, 
like large businesses, often do not generate enough internal cash to meet 
their needs. Thus, in 1987, for example, approximately 81 % of businesses 
with 5 to 9 employees obtained external funds through borrowing; the 
same year, approximately 90% of firms with 20 to 49 employees borrowed 
money from external sources. 7 
The characteristics of small business, however, which include relatively 
small amounts of revenues and assets, relatively small capital needs, few 
stockholders, and the absence of significant trading activity in the firm's 
stock, make it difficult for small businesses to access external capital. Such 
characteristics, in comparative terms, necessarily exclude small firms from 
the wide array of financing opportunities available to larger concerns. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, commercial banks appear to be a significant 
source of external financing for small businesses. For example, onJune 30, 
1994, commercial banks had on their books nearly 5 million business loans 
of less than $250,000; the total amount of all such loans was approxi-
mately $156 billion.8 The total number of business loans of less than 
6. Id. at 15 (noting that "[s]mall firms have been estimated by the Futures Group to be 
responsible for 55[%] of manufacturing product innovations and they produce more than 
twice as many innovations per employee as large firms L]" and that" [t] hey ... produce twice 
as many significant innovations per employee."). 
7. /d. at 348, Table B.18. In 1987, the average total debt for firms with five to nine 
employees was $126,220; for firms with 20 to 49 employees, the average debt for 1987 was 
$474,890. /d. at 349, Table B.19. 
8. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REpORT 
OF THE PRESIDENT 1995, at 307, Table B.9 (1996) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL 
BUSINESS 1995]. 
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$1 million was about 5.4 million loans, with a total value of about $294 
billion.9 
Equally predictable, underwritten offerings generally are unavailable for 
small issuers. In 1988, for example, among entities with assets of $10 
million or less, only 83 firms undertook initial public offerings of securities 
(the average offering was $7.9 million).l0 Although by 1994 such small 
issuers made 189 initial public offerings, averaging $10.3 million per of-
fering, II in both years, the number of initial public offerings l2 were min-
uscule when compared to the literally millions of small businesses with 
capital needs. 
One also gets a sense of the relatively disadvantaged position of small 
issuers by comparing their access to the capital market. In any year, initial 
public offerings by small issuers amount to only about 7% or 8% of the 
total dollar volume of initial public offerings. 13 Small companies, however, 
account for around 40% of the business activities l4 and control 40% of 
the assets in our economy. IS 
CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing discussion leads to a few simple conclusions about small 
businesses: (i) there are many of them; (ii) they are important to the econ-
omy; (iii) they need access to external capital; and (iv) external capital 
sources for small businesses are limited. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 309, Table B.II. 
II. See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1995, supra note 8, at 309, Table B.II. 
12. See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994, supra note I, at 164, Table A.4. 
13. The SBA estimates that initial public offerings by small issuers (businesses with assets 
under $10 million before the offering) generated only 7.9% of the total dollar volume of 
initial public offerings by all companies for the period 1988-1994. THE STATE OF SMALL 
BUSINESS 1995, supra note 8, at 299, Table B.l. For 1994 alone, such small issuers accounted 
for 6.9% of the total dollar volume of initial public offerings. /d. at 309, Table B.I!. One 
should recognize that these figures are for "initial" public offerings. Initial public offerings 
are likely to be only a fraction of the total public offerings made by larger corporations, as 
larger corporations are quite likely to have made previous public offerings of their securities 
and thus, many public offerings of their stock would not be "initial." On the other hand, 
initial public offerings are likely to represent nearly all of the public offerings by small issuers, 
as it is unlikely that an issuer would be a "small" issuer (i.e., have assets of less than $10 
million), if it had made a public offering previously. 
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
15. SBA estimates for 1993 indicate that unincorporated businesses and small corpora-
tions with assets of less than $25 million accounted for approximately 40% of the total 
business assets in our economy. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1995, supra note 8, at 299, 
Table B.!. 
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THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL AND STATE SECURITIES
LAWS ON SMALL BUSINESSES
Over the years, federal and state securities regulation has added signifi-
candy to the plight of small businesses by making it unnecessarily difficult
for them to raise capital. 16 In fairness to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Commission or SEC), however, one must recognize that in
recent years the federal rules governing the distribution of securities have
become much more reasonable with regard to small issuers. 17 Examples
of sensible changes at the federal level include the adoption and subse-
quent amendments to Rule 14418 and Regulation D,19 the adoption and
sensible interpretations of Rule 147,20 the modifications and expansion of
the availability of Regulation A,2 1 and the development of the special
registration forms for small issuers.2 2 Considered as a whole, these devel-
opments reflect an awakening of the Commission to the significance of
small businesses in this country and to the fact that small businesses cannot
reach their full potential if they are saddled with unreasonable regulations
16. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nnsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10
J. CORP. L. 553 (1985); Rutheford B Campbell,Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under
Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems that Need Attention, 74 Ky. LJ. 127 (1985-86); Rutheford
B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure
from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE Lj. 1139 [hereinafter Campbell, Practical Foreclosure].
17. See Rutheford B Campbell,Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure,
22J. CORP. L. 175, 180-85 (1997).
18. 17 C.ER. § 230.144 (1997). As originally enacted, Rule 144 was practically unavail-
able for small issuers, principally because holders of securities of small issuers could not meet
the brokers' transaction requirements. See Campbell, Practical Foreclosure, supra note 16, at
1150-53. Subsequently, the SEC added section (k) to Rule 144, which permitted resales by
nonaffiliates after a three-year holding period without meeting the brokers' transaction re-
quirement (and other requirements) of the rule. Recently, the Commission amended Rule
144(k) to lower the holding period to two years. 17 CER. § 230.144(k).
19. 17 C.ER. § 230.501-.508. The most significant amendments to Regulation D for small
issuers were the amendments increasing the size limit of Rule 504 to $1 million and per-
mitting the Rule 504 offering to be made publicly.
20. Id. § 230.147. The SEC has taken a generous attitude regarding the availability of
Rule 147, which clarifies conditions for the intrastate offering exemption, from the date of
its enactment. Rule 147 details those conditions that will allow an issuer doing business within
a state or territory to offer and sell securities to persons resident within that state or territory
without triggering the registration requirements under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act). Rule 147 interprets liberally the "doing business within" provision, permitting its use
in transactions with various interstate contacts. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 Under
the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5450, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
2340, at 2611 (Jan. 7, 1974) (adopting Rule 147 and providing liberal interpretive examples
of the availability of the rule to apply to transactions with interstate contacts).
21. 17 C.FR. § 230.251-263.
22. The SEC provides two forms for the registration of public offerings by small issuers.
They are Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, Form SB-1, and Reg-
istration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, Form SB-2, both as amended in Phase
Two Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,755,
39,763-64 (1997).
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regarding capital formation. 23 Unfortunately, these advances at the federal
level were not matched at the state level. As a result, the drag on capital
formation imposed by state blue sky regulations, especially as concerns
small issuers, became even more prominent.24
The most visible problem in state regulation was the multi-state regu-
lation of the capital formation process. Take, for example, the simple sit-
uation in which a small issuer desired to raise capital by selling securities
in four states. The issuer was required to comply with four sets of state
securities laws (in addition, of course, to federal laws), all of which were
essentially designed to achieve the same ends but which may have had
quite different rules of compliance. The economic extravagance of such
a system is apparent and seemingly irrefutable; the societal benefits of
requiring an issuer to do the same thing four times (five times, if one adds
the federal requirements) are at best difficult to comprehend. The problem,
of course, is exacerbated as more states are included in the offering.
Another related problem with state regulation was that the states had
the power to neutralize any of the federal rules that improved access to
capital by small (or large) issuers. By enacting or by letting stand more
restrictive state rules, state regulators were able to exercise hegemony over
the SEC, thus effectively neutralizing the new balance struck at the federal
level between capital formation and investor protection.
Take, for example, the recent changes in Rule 50425 of Regulation D,
which permit public offerings of up to $1 million by small issuers without
offeree qualifications, mandated disclosures, or resale restrictions. States
essentially neutralized the effects of those changes by refusing to include
Rule 504 under their Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (JLOE) or
otherwise providing a similar exemption that was consistent with the fed-
eral policy of Rule 504.26 Accordingly, an issuer in the author's home state
23. These developments, however, may be explained by an alternative, ugly interpretation
based on a theory of administrative hypocrisy. Under this interpretation, the SEC realigned
its rules in a way that is more congenial to capital formation by small investors, knowing full
well that substantially all of its progress in that regard would be eliminated by state blue sky
laws, which effectively trump federal laws and rules. The SEC, so the interpretation goes,
actually favors the states' more conservative positions, but it (hypocritically) wants to be able
to tout its own behavior as beneficial to small business. The reality for small issuers, of course,
is that the more restrictive state laws continue to dictate the rules of capital formation. See
Campbell, supra note 17, at 209, where the author describes, but does not necessarily endorse,
such an interpretation.
24. See Campbell, supra note 17, at 203-06.
25. 17 C.ER. § 230.504.
26. Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 6201, at 6101 (Apr.
29, 1989). Although the ULOE provides generally that offerings under Rule 505 or Rule
506 of Regulation D are exempt from state registration, it attaches additional conditions and
limitations to this exemption, including requirements in sales to nonaccredited purchasers
that the investment be suitable and the purchaser have the knowledge and experience to be
able to evaluate the merits and risks of a given investment. For discussions of the ULOE,
see Ronald L. Fein et al., ULOE: Comprehending the Confusion, 43 Bus. LAw. 737 (1988); Therese
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of Kentucky, for example, could not make an unregistered public offering
under Rule 504 because Kentucky had no comparable exemption. An
issuer using Rule 504 in Kentucky could either register the securities,
which requires27 a registration statement and mandated, scheduled disclo-
sures to investors, or utilize Kentucky's small offering exemption, which
on its face prohibits public offerings by: (i) limiting the issuer to twenty-
five offerees; and (ii) prohibiting the payment of a commission or other
remuneration for soliciting offerees. 28 The policy of Rule 504, therefore,
was trumped by state blue sky law.
THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKET
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996 ON SMALL ISSUERS
The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA or
the Act)2 9 seems designed to deal with these problems. Indeed, in itsJoint
Explanatory Statement, the Committee of Conference described the then
existing "dual system of regulation" of securities as one "that, in many
instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective." 30 The purpose of NSMIA,
as defined by the committee, is to "eliminate duplicative and unnecessary
regulatory burdens while preserving important investor protections by real-
locating responsibility over the regulation of the nation's securities markets
in a more logical fashion . ,,"l Notwithstanding such rhetoric and the
Act's apparently broad preemption of state laws, NSMIA itself has no
significant effect on the capital formation rules that govern small issuers.
Rather, small businesses are subject essentially to the same state rules after
NSMIA as they were before the Act.3 2
To understand why NSMIA itself provides no relief for small issuers,
one need only compare the manner in which small issuers raise capital
H. Maynard, The Unirm Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform" is "Uniform?"--An Evaluation
and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY LJ. 357 (1987); Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens,
ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45 Bus. LAW. 1319 (1990).
27. Many states, including Kentucky, developed a special form for registering Rule 504
offerings. The form, known as SCOR (Small Corporate Offering Registration), was officially
designated Form U-7 and developed by the State Regulation of Securities Committee of the
American Bar Association's Section of Business Law, in conjunction with the North Amer-
ican Securities Administrators' Association (NASAA). Small Corporate Offerings Registra-
tion Form (Form U-7), NASAA Rep. (CCH) 5057, at 5197 (Apr. 26, 1996). By September
1997, SCOR was adopted in 43 states (including five unofficial recognitions of the form).
Small Corporate Offering Registration Program and Form U-7, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
6461 at 2557 (Apr. 26, 1997).
28. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292.410(l)(i) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
29. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter NSMIA].
30. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996).
31. Id. at 39-40.
32. Congress, however, delegated to the SEC broad authority to expand preemption
through regulation. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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with the limits of NSMITs statutory preemption provisions. Regarding
the manner of capital formation by small business, in 1994, out of the
four million or so small businesses in the United States, fewer than 200
sold stock through initial public offerings. 33 All the rest of those small
businesses that sought outside capital during 1994 did so in reliance on an
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
(1933).34
Under the 1933 Act, the registration exemptions upon which small busi-
nesses generally can rely for such offerings are quite limited and thus easy
to identify. Specifically, exemptions available to small businesses engaged
in raising capital are typically confined to the intrastate offering exemption
provided by Rule 147, 35 the small offering exemptions provided by Rule
50436 and Rule 505,37 and the exemption provided by Regulation A.3 8
Although other exemptions are actually or theoretically available to small
issuers, they are either specialized in their scope 39 or comparatively un-
attractive, 4
0
NSMIA itself, however, provides no preemption for offerings under any
of these broadly utilized exemptions from registration. Instead, the statute
itself preempts state authority only with regard to securities listed for trad-
ing on certain exchanges or the NASDAQ/National Market System
33. In 1994, only 189 small issuers (defined here as issuers with less than $10 million in
assets before the offering) made initial public offerings. See supra notes I 1-12 and accompa-
nying text. It is safe to estimate that more than four million small businesses were in existence
that year. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
34. This is something of an overstatement, as a portion of these unregistered financings
may have involved transactions that did not generate a "security" under the federal securities
laws or were illegal under federal securities laws.
35. 17 CYR. § 230.147 (1997).
36. Id. § 230.504.
37. Id. § 230.505.
38. Id. §§ 230.251-.263.
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994) (providing an exemption from registration for
securities issued by banks); id. § 77c(a)(9) (providing an exemption from registration for trans-
actions involving single company recapitalizations).
40. The intrastate exemption provided by § 3(a)(l 1) of the 1933 Act, id. § 77c(a)(1 1), as
defined by the common law, is an example of an exemption that has fallen into disuse because
of its comparative disadvantage. Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147, is comparatively clearer and
thus less risky than § 3(a)(l 1). Another example is § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6), which is unused
because of the comparative advantage of Regulation D. 15 CER. §§ 230.501-.508. To a
lesser degree, perhaps, offerings under the common law of § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), are
also less attractive than offerings under Regulation D.
Special mention should be made of the exemption provided by Rule 506. Securities issued
in Rule 506 transactions are "covered securities" and thus subject to the statutory preemption
of NSMIA. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1997). Rule 506 is attractive for private
offerings in excess of $5 million. Because that amount of capital normally exceeds the needs
of small issuers or the maximum amount of securities small issuers are able to market, the
author gives Rule 506 minimal consideration in this Article. If, however, a small issuer is able
to use Rule 506 effectively, NSMIA does provide benefits because it preempts state regulation
over such offerings. See Campbell, supra note 17, at 205.
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(NMS), securities issued by registered investment companies and securities
issued pursuant to certain enumerated exemptions under the 1933 Act.4 1
This latter category, however, excludes from preemption securities issued
pursuant to the federal exemptions provided by Rule 147, Rule 504, Rule
505, and Regulation A.
In summary, NSMIA itself essentially changed nothing for small issu-
ers.42 Accordingly, when small issuers attempt to raise capital, the various
states continue to impose additional layers of rules respecting capital for-
mation. If a small issuer attempts to raise its capital in four states, it has
five jurisdictions with which to contend. If it raises capital in a single state,
it has two jurisdictions with which to contend.
Similarly, on the matter of state hegemony, nothing has changed. States
continue to set rules of capital formation and thus neutralize the positive
effects of changes in federal capital formation rules. Rule 504 again serves
as a good example. 43 After NSMIAs passage, issuers practically cannot
make small public offerings under Rule 504, because such offerings are
inconsistent with state blue sky laws, and the Act has no preemptive stat-
utory effect over such state laws.
Speculation about the political basis for this legislative outcome is in-
teresting. Why, for example, did Congress agree on a version of NSMIA
that was so unhelpful to small businesses? Intriguing, in that regard, is the
fact that an earlier House version of the Act, then known as the Capital
Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995 (Capital Markets
Bill),44 offered significant relief for small issuers. 45 This relief, however,
evaporated during the subsequent legislative process.
One explanation for the outcome is provided by public choice theory46
or interest group theory.47 Public choice theory proposes that small groups
in which each member has much to gain or lose as a result of legislation
will have more influence over the outcome of the legislation than will
41. NSMIA, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102, 110 Stat. 3416, at 3417-19 (1996) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77r). More specifically, NSMIA omits from its list of "covered securities," and
thus from statutory preemption, securities issued in transactions exempt under § 3(a)(l 1),
§ 3(b), and the common law of § 4(2).
42. Although NSMIA does provide benefits for issuers using Rule 506, the author assumes
that Rule 506 is not attractive to small issuers. See Campbell, supra note 17, at 205.
43. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
44. H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995).
45. Section 3(a) of that bill preempted state authority over all offerings, except those made
in reliance on the intrastate exemption. Id. § 3(a).
46. The literature on public-choice theory is vast. A compact and clear description of the
application of public-choice theory to legislative behavior and the impact of interest groups
on legislative outcomes is offered by Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 873-901 (1987), and by Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223, 227-33 (1986).
47. Macey, supra note 46, at 224 n.5.
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larger groups in which each member has relatively little to gain or lose.
This is true, the theory goes, even though the total gain or loss of the
larger group may be greater than the total gain or loss of the smaller
group. 48 Public choice theory offers an economic explanation for all of
this.
4 9
One is able to fit public choice theory to the outcome in this situation
by examining how NSMIA affected three interest groups: the mutual fund
industry, state securities regulators, and small issuers. The mutual fund
industry appears to be a relatively small group without insurmountable
"free-rider" problems, and that group got essentially what they wanted
out of the legislation in the form of an express preemption of all state
laws respecting the public offerings of their securities. 50 Similarly, the state
administrators, acting in concert through NASAA, apparently exerted con-
siderable influence over NSMIA's ultimate terms. The earlier version of
the bill that became NSMIA preempted state authority, and thus the au-
thority of state administrators, over all registration and merit qualification,
except as concerned securities issued under the intrastate exemption. 5' As
enacted, however, this single exception to total federal preemption was
48. "The 'free[-]rider' problem suggests that it should be nearly impossible to organize
large groups of individuals to seek broadly dispersed public goods. Instead, political activity
should be dominated by small groups of individuals seeking to benefit themselves, usually at
the public expense." Farber & Frickey, supra note 46, at 892. A "free rider" is one who attains
or attempts to attain benefits from an action without participating in bringing about or paying
for the action.
49. See, e.g., William W. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875 (1975), wherein the authors describe the economic
perspective as follows:
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government, legislation is
supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation. The
price that the winning group bids is determined both by the value of legislative protec-
tion to the group's members and the group's ability to overcome the free-rider problems
that plague coalitions. Payment takes the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit
promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In short, legislation is "sold"
by the legislature and "bought" by the beneficiaries of the legislation.
Id. at 877 (citation omitted). Because of the free-rider problems and high transaction costs
in forming large groups, economists predict that large groups generally will not be as effective
in influencing legislation as will small groups, which have lower transaction costs and fewer
free-rider problems. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 69-70 (1981) (observing that "[m] embers of the mass public will gen-
erally find it irrational to obtain the information necessary to identify their interests on any
given issue and moreover will be ill-equipped to interpret any information they do obtain");
see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 46, at 892; Macey, supra note 46, at 229-32.
50. NSMIA defines a "covered security" to include "a security issued by an investment
company." 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997). NSMIA preempts state rules over
registration and merit qualification with respect to "covered securities." Id. § 77r(a)(1). Inci-
dentally, this is a good outcome for society. The distribution of mutual fund securities is a
national matter that should not be regulated by the individual states.
51. See supra note 47.
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expanded dramatically to include not only securities issued in transactions
exempt under the intrastate exemption but also securities issued under
Rule 504, Rule 505, Regulation A, and the common law of section 4(2)
under the 1933 Act. Again, NASAA provided the cohesion for a relatively
small interest group, which accordingly minimized the free-rider prob-
lems. 52 Public choice theory, therefore, would have predicted that the state
administrators could be effective in bending the Act more to their liking.53
On the other hand, the millions of small issuers, who in total seemingly
had more to gain or lose than either the mutual fund industry or the
individual state administrators, received essentially nothing from the leg-
islation. Small issuers constituted a large, diffuse group; free-rider problems
are enormous for such a group and thus make it difficult for the group to
exercise effective influence over legislation. The transaction costs for that
diffuse group were simply too high for them to be effective in getting their
way in the matter.
Another view of NSMIA, however, is less cynical about the legislative
process than the view proffered by public choice theory54 and ultimately
is more hopeful regarding the final outcome of the scope of preemption.
This interpretative version of NSMIA relies on the relationship between
Congress and its administrative agencies and more specifically on Con-
gress' use of an administrative agency, in this case the SEC, as a vehicle
to achieve a sensible outcome without congressional members' expending
undue amounts of their political capital. This version suggests that the
Commission pursuant to its delegated authority should act boldly to com-
plete the preemption begun by the statute itself. All of this requires expla-
nation, however.
As described above, an earlier version of the legislation that became
NSMIA, the Capital Markets Bill, preempted all state control over regis-
tration and merit qualification, except for transactions exempt from federal
registration under the intrastate exemption. As it became law, however,
preemption under the statutory language of NSMIA was significantly re-
duced from the broad preemption proposed in the Capital Markets Bill,
52. See Campbell, supra note 17, at 198-99.
53. For a brief description and history of NASAA, see Maynard, supra note 26, at 360,
n.7. (noting that NASAA "is comprised of representatives from all [50] states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and several of the Canadian provinces. NASAA has been re-
sponsible for promulgating a number of statements of policy with respect to registration of
particular types of securities, as well as developing several uniform registration forms.").
54. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 877 (describing the economic view as one
in which legislation is " 'sold' by the legislature" in return for "[p]ayments [that] take the
form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes
outright bribes"). The assumption regarding the conduct of legislators, specifically that they
act without regard for the best interests of society, not surprisingly, is hotly contested by some.
See, e.g., AbnerJ. Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167
(1988) ("The politicians and other people I have known in public life just do not fit the 'rent-
seeking' egoist model that the public choice theorists offer.").
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leaving states, as a matter of statutory language, essentially unfettered in
their control over the capital formation activities of small issuers. At the
same time, however, NSMIA authorized the Commission through its rule-
making to expand the scope of the statutory preemption to include trans-
actions in which securities are offered or sold to any "qualified purchasers,
as defined by the Commission by rule." 55
The SEC's definitional authority respecting "qualified purchasers" is set
by statute and is exceedingly broad. Specifically, NSMIA states that the
definition of "qualified purchaser" shall be "consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors." 56 NSMIA further requires that,
when "the Commission is ... required to consider... whether an action
is... in the public interest," the Commission shall consider, "in addition
to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. '57 In short, the Act indicates that the
Commission under the "qualified purchaser" rubric is able to expand sig-
nificantly the scope of preemption, limited only by the principles of the
protection of investors and the promotion of competition and capital for-
mation. 58
All the foregoing is consistent with an interpretation of NSMIA in which
Congress retreated from the politically expensive statutory preemption re-
gime originally contained in the Capital Markets Bill in favor of a more
modest statutory preemption regime found in NSMIA. To accomplish its
original political end, however, which was a broad preemption of state
authority over capital formation, this shift to a more moderate statutory
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(3). The section provides:
A security is a covered security with respect to the offer or sale of the security to qualified
purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule. In prescribing such rule, the Com-
mission may define the term "qualified purchaser" differently with respect to different
categories of securities, consistent with the public interest and the protection of inves-
tors.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 77b(b). This section in full provides as follows:
Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and
is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in
the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Id.
58. Admittedly, certain committee language is inconsistent with such a broad interpreta-
tion of the SEC's authority to expand preemption. Such committee language, however, is
confusing and inconclusive. Additionally, to interpret such committee language as signifi-
cantly limiting the authority of the SEC to expand the definition of "covered securities,"
and thus preemption, is inconsistent with the clear language of the statute itself described
in the text. In all events, of course, clear language of a statute should trump committee
language. See Campbell, supra note 17, at 207-10.
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preemption was accompanied by an expansive delegation to an adminis-
trative agency, which delegation not only permits bold action by the Com-
mission but, indeed, through statutory language suggests with some
strength that such aggressive regulatory preemption is appropriate.
Under this view of NSMIA, the SEC should complete the statutory
preemption by defining "qualified purchasers" to include all purchasers
of securities acquired in transactions exempt under Regulation A, Rule
147, Rule 504, and Rule 505. This outcome is supported not only by the
foregoing analysis of the relationship between Congress and the SEC, but
also by the language of NSMIA and public policy considerations.
Leaving aside for the moment Rule 147 transactions, expanding pre-
emption to include securities issued in transactions exempt under Regu-
lation A, Rule 504, and Rule 505 is consistent with NSMIAs mandate
that the preemption expansion under the "qualified purchasers" rubric be
based on an appropriate balance between investor protection and capital
formation, because each of those exemptions is based to a significant de-
gree on a determination by the Commission that the terms of the exemp-
tions are consistent with an appropriate balance between investor protec-
tion and capital formation. In other words, the Commission already is on
record with its conclusion that Regulation A, Rule 504, and Rule 505 are
consistent with the preemption expansion criteria of NSMIA.
Regulation A, for example, was enacted under section 3(b) of the 1933
Act, which limits regulations thereunder to those "in the public interest
and for the protection of investors." 59 The SEC's 1992 amendments to
Regulation A, in which the SEC expanded the limits of Regulation A
offerings and approved the "test the water" provisions, and the release
accompanying the adoption of those amendments confirm the thoughtful
balance the SEC struck in Regulation A between investor protection and
capital formation.60
Similarly, today's versions of Rules 504 and 505, which are part of
Regulation D, are the results of protracted, well-considered administrative
actions in which the SEC sought a proper balance between capital for-
mation and investor protection. 6 1 Accordingly, for example, when the SEC
fine-tuned this balance in 1992 by expanding the availability of Rule 504,
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
60. In the release adopting the 1992 amendments to Regulation A, the SEC described its
consideration and analysis of the changes on competition and investor protection in Regu-
lation A. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 72,439, at 62,167-70 (July 30, 1992).
61. The release accompanying the initial adoption of Regulation D described the regu-
lation as intended to "facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors."
Regulation D--Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,106, at 84,907 (Mar.
8, 1982). For a discussion of the balance between investor protection and capital formation
in Rule 504 and Rule 505, see Campbell, supra note 17, at 190-92, 194-95.
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the release accompanying the adoption of the amendments again empha-
sized that those amendments were adopted only after consideration of
investor protection and the need for capital formation. 6 2
Such an argument, that the Commission's rules are based on a preex-
isting, thoughtful balance of investor protection and promotion of capital
formation, admittedly is more difficult to make in the context of Rule 147.
The problem here goes back to uncertainty regarding the policy basis for
section 3(a)(11).63 Commentators have always had trouble finding clear
evidence of the policy basis for section 3(a)(l 1),64 although two separate
bases seem the most attractive candidates. One such basis is that the geo-
graphic proximity between the bulk of the issuer's business activities and
the offerees of the securities diminishes the need for the mandated disclo-
sure requirements of section 5 of the 1933 Act.65 This, of course, is a
straightforward economic argument that bargaining for investment infor-
mation in such instances is efficient and thus that no governmentally man-
dated disclosures of investment information are necessary. This theory
seems based, in turn, on the idea that this unfettered bargaining for in-
vestment information represents the appropriate balance between investor
protection and capital formation.
The second such possible policy basis for section 3(a)(1 1) is the existence
of state blue sky laws.66 The rationale here is that if the offering is truly
local, the federal government can appropriately rely on the states to enact
laws and rules dealing with the offer and sale of such securities. 67
It is impossible to determine whether the Commission based the present
version of Rule 147 solely on the existence of a state regulatory scheme.
Although the release adopting the rule indicates that the existence of the
state regulatory schemes was a significant factor, the release provides some
62. See Securities Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 62,165-78.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1).
64. See, e.g., Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, 3 SECURITIES REGULATION 1276 (3d ed.,
1989) (observing that "[t]he legislative history of § 3(a)(1 1) is sparse"). In his early, fine piece
on Rule 147, Professor Hicks lists six possible bases for exempting intrastate offerings from
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act, including the protection accorded by the
geographic proximity of the issuer and the offerees, and the existence of state regulatory
schemes. J. William Hicks, Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REV. 463, 499
(1974).
65. See Hicks, supra note 64, at 502.
66. Id.
67. None of this is conclusive. The release accompanying the adoption of Rule 147
indicates a strong desire to promote both investor protection and capital formation, the latter
to be served by the certainty of the criteria of the exemption provided by Rule 147. Con-
ditions for Intrastate Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 5450, 1 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 2340, at 2611 to 2611-2 (Jan. 7, 1974). This release recognizes the two possible
bases for the exemption provided by § 3(a)(l 1), noting that, "[i]n theory, the investors would
be protected both by their proximity to the issuer and by state regulation," and adds that
"Rule 147 reflects this [c]ongressional intent and is limited in its application to transactions
where state regulation will be most effective." Id. at 2611-2.
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basis for the conclusion that meeting the requirements of Rule 147 also 
provide appropriate protection for investors even without state blue sky 
laws. 
In any event, even if Rule 147 originally were based solely on the ex-
istence of a state regulatory scheme, the Commission still could (and this 
author believes that it should) conclude that today the appropriate balance 
between investor protection and capital formation is struck by preemption 
with respect to Rule 147 transactions. The Commission could easily con-
clude that investors, following such preemption, would be appropriately 
protected by two factors. First is their ability to bargain for investment 
information, which is facilitated by geographic proximity between the is-
suer and the investors. Additionally, investors would be protected by the 
federal antifraud rules under the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,68 which rules mandate disclosure by the issuer of all material 
. facts, a sensible level of required disclosure in such instances. In light of 
this and in light of the benefit to capital formation, especially to small 
investors, of removing the second layer of regulation at the hands of the 
state, the Commission could and should determine that preemption of 
state regulation respecting Rule 147 transactions is consistent with the 
preemption criteria of NSMIA. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Small businesses may account for 40% of the business activities in this 
country, but capital formation rules always have discriminated against 
small businesses and imposed rules that make it unreasonably difficult for 
small companies to exploit external sources of capital. NSMIA, through 
its broad statutory delegation to the SEC of the right to expand the pre-
emption of state blue sky laws, provides a unique opportunity for the 
Commission to deliver much-needed and much-deserved help to small 
issuers engaged in capital formation and to finally break the hegemonic 
hold states have over the rules governing capital formation by small busi-
nesses. Society will benefit if the SEC moves boldly to implement this 
delegated authority to expand the statutory preemption of NSMIA. 
68. The most obvious examples are § 12(a)(2) in the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (1994), 
and Rule IOb-5 in the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 Ob-5 (1997). 
